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THE PFIZER REASONABLE BASIS TEST-FAST
RELIEF FOR CONSUMERS BUT A
HEADACHE FOR ADVERTISERS
In Pfizer, Inc.,1 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) warned
that any advertising claim made without a "reasonable basis" or
prior substantiation would violate section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,2 "[w]hether or not the claim [was] true and the
product performed as advertised . . "3 The Pfizer opinion clearly
indicates that henceforth the FTC not only will respond to consumer
complaints of falsity and fraud, but also will affirmatively challenge
unsubstantiated claims as an advertising method harmful to con-
sumers. Since the summer of 1971, the FTC has required substan-
tiation briefs from major advertisers.4  Upon examining this required
1. 3 TR.ADE REG. REP. 20,056, at 22,029 (FTC July 11, 1972).
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
J. BISHOP & H. HUBBARD, LET THE SELLER BEWARE (1969) [hereinafter cited as
BISHOP];
E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. ScisULE, 'THE NADm REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION (1969) [hereinafter cited as NADER REPORT];
ABA, REPORT OF THE COMIasSSION To STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT];
Travers, Foreward to Symposium: Federal Trade Commission Regulation of
Deceptive Advertising, 17 U. KAN. L. REv. 551 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Travers];
Interview with Robert Pitofsky, Director of FTC Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, reprinted in 595 BNA ANTrrausT & TRADE REG. REP. AA-1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Pitofsky Interview].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). The most important provision of the Act
relevant to consumer protection states: "Unfair methods of competition in com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlaw-
ful." Id.
3. Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 1 20,056, at 22,029 (FTC July 11, 1972)
(emphasis added).
4. Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1970),
grants additional powers to the FTC, including authority to investigate and compile
information concerning the organization or practices of any corporation, to re-
quire corporations to furnish written reports in answer to written questions, and
to publicize at the FTC's discretion any available information 'with the exception
of trade secrets and the names of customers.
The broad investigational role of the FTC in other than antitrust cases has
frequently been upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950); United States v. National Biscuit Co., 25 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)
(although the Commission was empowered to issue a questionnaire to defendant-
company, the FTCA did not authorize penalties for defendant's failure to answer
the questionnaire).
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documentation, the Commission recently issued its first formal com-
plaints based on Pfizer,5 transforming the primarily investigative sub-
stantiation program into a potentially powerful enforcement tool.
The new aggressiveness of the FTC stands in marked contrast
to the Commission's previous "portrait of impotence"' in consumer
protection. For over fifty years, the FTC, underfunded, misdirected,
and demoralized,' struggled with infrequent success against con-
sumer fraud.' Numerous theories have been offered to explain the
FTC's ineffectiveness, 9 and some critics have even advocated abol-
5. See notes 100-01 infra and accompanying text.
6. NADER REPORT 68. The investigating group suggested that behind the
FTC's past impotence may have been a "powerlessness with a purpose." Id.
This purpose was viewed as favoritism for "big business and Congressional inter-
ests." Id. at 38-39.
7. ABA REPORT 34-37.
The two recurring criticisms of the FTC . . . -failure to plan and the
crippling delay in its procedures-are about as serious today as at any time
in the agency's history. . . . [lit is our impression that there are too many
instances of incompetence in the agency, particularly in senior staff positions.
Additional aspects of recent FTC performance are also disturbing.
Under-allocation of resources for consumer protection ... [has] sapped the
FTC's effectiveness in critical areas of its responsibility . . . . Congress is
partly responsible for the FTC's problems because of its practice of com-
nutting important new legislative programs to the agency without com-
mensurate increases in budget. [However, we] also conclude that the FTC
has not done what it could with the resources that have been available to
it. Id. at 34.
8. A notable exception was the strikingly effective FTC crusade against cigar-
ette advertising and labeling. See Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling
of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 16 C.F.R. § 408
(1973) (trade regulation rule). For a critical analysis of the anti-smoking cam-
paigns of the FTC and FCC and first amendment implications, see Redish, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429, 464-68 (1971).
9. Limited resources have been a major problem for the FTC. Compare
NADER REPORT 87, 225 with Letter from FTC Chairman Miles Kirkpatrick to
Senator Lee Metcalf, reprinted in part in 564 BNA ANrIRUST & TRADE Ran. REP.
A-15 (1972). Although appropriations have doubled since 1968, almost one-half
of the funds are allocated to antitrust enforcement. See generally ABA REPORT
26-27. The Bureau of Consumer Protection Budget is still dwarfed by the com-
bined television advertising budgets of the makers of such major products as
"Anacin" and "Bayer Aspirin." NADER REPORT 22-23; Travers 556.
According to one observer, the powerful role in the economy of the inher-
ently deceptive advertising industry necessarily reduces the FTC to a "cosmetic
operation." Id. at 558. For a general discussion of how consumer purchasing
motives encourage deception, see J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE
325-53 (1967). See also Charlton & Fawcett, The FTC and False Advertising,
17 U. KAN. L. Rnv. 599, 601 (1969).
The opposition of powerful business interests may also have contributed to
the Commission's ineffectiveness. See Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-
The FTC Response, 26 FooD DRUG COsM. L.J. 609, 625 (1971); cf. STAFF OF
SUtCOMM. ON CONSUMERS OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., REPORT ON INITIATIVES IN CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, reprinted in part in
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ishing the FTC altogether."° The FTC, however, not only has sur-
vived the blistering criticism of the late 1960's, but recently has
plunged into new areas of regulation. Advertisers have understand-
ably viewed this development with dismay, as the "tigers of the
FTC"" become more and more the "omnipresent overseer[s] of a
corporation's day-to-day activities."' 2  In addition to this vigorous
surge of consumer protectionism, the FTC has fashioned imagina-
tive and innovative orders to effectuate its new policies.13  By fram-
582 BNA ANTrITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. E-1 (1972) (listing business accom-
plishments in the field of consumer protection to "balance the record").
Within the Commission itself, the lack of planning and positive leadership
and the unwillingness to depart from traditional, ineffective enforcement proced-
ures were in great part responsible for the skepticism with which the FTC was
viewed. See ABA RPORT 3, 53; NADER REPORT 39.
The courts themselves have often been hostile to the FTC's consumer pro-
tection role. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 233
(1972); ABA REPORT 53; Comment, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act: A Source of Protection for Competitors and Consumers, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM.
L REv. 982, 992 (1971).
10. E.g., ABA REPORT 92-93, 104-05 (separate statement of Professor Richard
Posner).
11. 552 BNA ANTIUJST & TRADE REG. REP. A-31 (1972) (cautious ap-
proval of the new regulation given by Earl Kintner, former FTC Chairman).
Rumors surrounding the resignation of activist FTC Chairman Kirkpatrick,
former chairman of the commission which authored the ABA REPORT, see Ad-
dress by Senator Moss, reprinted in 582 BNA ANrrrusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-6
(1972), were quieted by the belief of insiders that his successor would follow
through with the many controversial programs now in operation. Address by
Robert Pitofsky, reprinted in part in 581 BNA A'rmTausT & TRAUD REG. REP.
A-2 (1972); see Pitofsky Interview AA-5.
12. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1972, at 5, col. 1 (statements before the ABA Na-
tional Institute on "Corporations Under Attack-Response to New Challenges").
Courts have not expected advertising to offer an objective appraisal of perti-
nent information and hence have previously tolerated a substantial amount of
trade "puffing." See, e.g., Lambert v. Sistunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952); Prince
v. Brackett, Shaw & Lunt Co., 125 Me. 31, 130 A. 509 (1925); Brown v. Globe
Labs, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957); American Laundry Mach. Co.
v. Skinner, 225 N.C. 285, 34 S.E.2d 190 (1945); Maupin v. Nutrena Mills, Inc.,
385 P.2d 504 (Okla. 1963). However, the scope of the FTC's recent efforts corre-
sponds with the' intensity of other important restrictions on corporate advertising by
administrative agencies. The SEC, for example, has strictly limited the advertising of
securities. See Rule 134, 17 CY.R. § 230.134 (1972); SEC Rule 433, id. §
230.433 (1972); SEC Rule 434A, id. § 230.434a (1972) ("waiting period" pro-
visions limiting written offerings to narrowly-drawn "tombstone" advertisements
and statutory prospectuses).
13. The impact of previous FTC orders was often limited by reliance on
cease-and-desist procedure and voluntary compliance. Although the Commission
has authority to promulgate industry guides, issue advisory opinions, and accept
informal assurances of voluntary compliance, the FTC's power to issue trade regu-
lation rules enforceable by the courts was denied in National Petroleum Refiner's
Vol. 1973:563]
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ing ad hoc remedies such as corrective advertising and counterad-
vertising orders, 14 the FTC in effect has begun to function as an
equity court.15 At the same time the Commission has even gone
so far as to award damages to consumers.10
Ass'n v. FrC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972). See Federal Administrative
Law Developments-1972, 1973 DuKE L.J. 336.
Such informal enforcement techniques have not been sufficient. "[With
such an obvious disinclination . . . to proceed formally we fear the business
community may cease to take seriously the guides, rules, and other administrative
pronouncements ...and also may cease to take seriously the statutes the FTC is
empowered to enforce." ABA REPORT 26.
Aside from voluntary compliance, the cease-and-desist order has been the
FTC's main weapon. Upon ascertaining a violation of a final order, the FTC
may seek civil penalties of up to $5,000 per day per violation. 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1) (1970). This remedy, however, is seldom pursued. ABA REPORT 24;
NADER REPORT 50. In the highly publicized "Geritol" litigation, which spanned
fifteen years of investigations, evasions, compliances, and orders, the FTC sought
and recently obtained fines in excess of $800,000-the largest such judgment ever.
The makers of "Geritol" had continually flouted the FTC's final order forcing
them to stop advertising the product as a cure for fatigue. See United States v.
J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The cease-and-desist order
is a potentially valuable tool. NADER REPORT 61. However, it is fraught with
inherent limitations. Even when a complaint is issued, investigations, hearings,
and appeals cause tremendous delay, usually until the advertising campaign is
completed. Furthermore, ineffective monitoring has often failed to turn up even the
most obvious violations of final orders. See ABA REPORT 28-32, 51; NADER
REPORT 43, 61, 62; Connor, FTC Procedure Revisions: A Critique, 7 VILL. L. REV.
359, 362 (1962); Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal Trade
Commission, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 559, 560 (1969); Weston, Deceptive Advertising
and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548,
561 (1964); Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 85 HARv. L. REV. 477, 482-83 (1971). See generally Auerbach, The Federal
Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383
(1964).
14. See notes 110-28 infra and accompanying text. The FTC's recent will-
ingness to experiment with new remedies enables the prior substantiation decisions
to become more than an idle policy statement or voluntary guideline. ABA Panel
Discussion, The FTC: Revitalized or Repackaged?, reprinted in part in 577 BNA
ANTrIrusr & TRADE REa. REP. A-7 (1972). The FTC has always had wide dis-
cretion in fashioning remedies, as the courts have deferred to agency expertise
once the violation has been established. E.g., Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411
(1958); Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884 (1959).
15. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972), where
the Court held that the FTC "does not arrogate excessive power to itself if . . .it,
like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in
the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws." See also Charles
Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920
(1969); Luria Bros. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829
(1968); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
16. In a Coca-Cola contest case, the complaint sought to require the re-
spondent to pay $100 to each contestant who complied with what the FTC thought
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This Note will examine the FTC's changing consumer protec-
tion role with respect to advertising. First, the expanding definition
of section 5 "unfairness" will be explored; second, the background
and rationale of the Pfizer decision will be examined; finally, the
probable future implications of Pfizer for advertising will be consid-
ered.
CONSUMERISM AND THE FTC's CHANGING ROLE IN ADVERTISING
The Congressional Mandate-Curbing Unfair Practices
The FTC was created with the broad goal of preventing all "un-
fair methods of competition in commerce."'17 The draftsmen delib-
erately refrained from defining "unfair methods," believing that
[i]t is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair prac-
tices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even
if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited,
it would be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were
to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless
task.' 8
Despite the breadth of the original goal, the courts adopted Presi-
dent Wilson's view of the Commission as a flexible instrumentality
"for doing justice to business"'9 wherever the antitrust laws and the
natural market forces were ineffective in removing restraints on com-
petition. Hence, injury to competitors was construed to be a pre-
requisite to FTC intervention.2"
was a reasonable interpretation of the contest rules. Coca-Cola Co., 3 TRADE REG.
REP. 119,290, at 21,457 (FTC 1970). The FTC has also held it can grant restitu-
tion to consumers. Curtis Publishing Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,719, at 21,757
(FTC 1971) (although the Commission asserted its power to do so, the facts of the
particular case did not warrant requiring the publishers of the defunct Saturday
Evening Post to refund unfilled subscriptions); Windsor Distrib. Co. [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,999, at 21,260 (FTC 1969) (initial order),
[1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,157, at 21,361 (FTC 1970)
(final order), enforced, 437 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1971) (requiring the distributor of
vending machines to repurchase the machines from dissatisfied customers).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), quoted in FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972).
19. 51 CONG. REC. 1963 (1914) (emphasis added). The courts supported
this view early in the Commission's history. See FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261
U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923); FTC v. Curtis, 260 U.S. 568 (1923); FTC v. Gantz,
253 U.S. 421 (1920).
20. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). Although the representations in
Raladam-that the drug was effective in "dissolving or otherwise removing excess
flesh of the human body"-involved a drug which could not safely be used
without medical supervision, there was no violation of section 5 since no harm to
a competitor could be shown. Id. at 645. The "anti-fat remedy" contained desic-
Vol. 1973:563]
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Congress reacted to this limited consumer protection role with
the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission
Act,2 which declared "all unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce""2 to be unlawful. The amendment's sponsors left no
doubt that its primary object was to extend the same protection to
consumers that the Act had given to businessmen.28 At the same
time, the amendment did not attempt to proscribe particular activi-
ties, again leaving "unfairness" in each case to be defined by the
FTC.24 Thus, the FTC was empowered to condemn any activity in
interstate commerce "contrary to public policy. '25
cated thyroid, Raladam Co., 12 F.T.C. 363, 364 (1929), an ingredient made from
animal glands which was "liable at all times to produce radical changes of condi-
tions that will be harmful," id. at 368, and "likely to create in the user . . . the
'laxative habit."' Id.
This prerequisite, though cumbersome, did not eliminate the consumer pro-
tection role, since injury to consumers also usually injured competitors. See, e.g.,
FTC v.. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co.,
291 U.S. 67 (1934); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933); 80 CoNG.
REc. 6436-37 (1936) (remarks of Senator Wheeler). Even if a competitor could
not show his customers had been unfairly lured away by the questioned practice,
a competitive injury was still relatively easy to find. "[Any member of industry
who violated the law, any law, to promote his business [is] acting unfairly toward
his competitors." Hearings on S. 3744 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936) (statement of FTC Commissioner
Davis), reprinted in WHEELER-LEA Acr-A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE R.CORD
406, 412 (Dunn ed. 1938).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1914).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). See note 2 supra. The "in commerce"
restriction on FTC jurisdiction was changed by the Senate to "affecting com-
merce," in the proposed Magnuson-Moss Consumer Products Warranties and FTC
Improvements Act. S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, § 201 (1971), reprinted in
117 CoNG. REc. 17,889 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971). Although the bill died in the
House Commerce Committee, Senate action is again expected in 1973. 597 BNA
ANTrrrusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-5 (1973).
23. E.g., 83 CNG. REc. 546-47 (1938) (remarks of Congressman Lea); H.R.
REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937); S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-3 (1936). The fact that one competitor might suffer slight economic loss
was relatively unimportant. "After all, Congress is not interested in whether
John Smith lost some money as the result of the advertising complained of, but the
question is whether or not the general public has been deceived or injured by ...
it." 80 CONG. REC. 6593 (1936) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
24. S. REP. No. 1705, supra note 23, at 1-2 (1936); Hearings on S. 3744,
supra note 20, at 5, 13 (statements by Commissioner Davis), reprinted in Dunn,
supra note 20, at 408.
25. Kritzik v. FTC, 125 F.2d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1942), where the court held
the use of punch-board games as a sales technique to be against public policy and
thus violative of section 5.
Some legislators were apparently worried that the unfairness standard might
be unconstitutionally vague and that well-intentioned individuals might not know
what to do to comply. See 80 CoNG. REc. 6596 (1936) (remarks of Senator
White). This fear might have been one reason the sponsors of the amendment
[Vol. 1973:563
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Judicial Search for a Standard
The Supreme Court has avoided the question of a precise defi-
nition of "unfairness," '26 apparently relying on the belief that the
FTC or the appellate courts will know unfairness when they see it.27
Thus, tying arrangements 28 and the sale of merchandise through
lotteries and punch-board games29 were held to be unfair trade prac-
tices. Pre-ticketing, a manufacturer's practice of stamping standard
price-tags on his product, could be held to violate section 5 where
retailers habitually marked down the price, thereby misleading the
consumer to believe he was receiving a bargain. 0 Nor could re-
were careful to call it a mere clarification of the 1914 Act, which was upheld in
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919). See S. REP. No. 1705,
supra note 23, at 2-3 (1936).
Compare Interview with Robert Pitofsky, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion Director, reprinted in 545 BNA AN~riusr & TRnAn REG. REP. A-6 (1972):
"Section 5 is the most marvelously flexible instrument of consumer protection that
I could imagine. I have often said that if it were any vaguer it would probably
be unconstitutional .... We have the capacity in this agency to review virtu-
ally every consumer problem that's going to come up."
26. The formal demand for prior substantiation, a new and far-reaching as-
sertion of the FTC's power in economic consumer protectionism, may lead to
demands for a more definite unfairness standard. Until Pfizer and FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), the need to define "unfair" in advertising
cases was lessened by the fact that most cases also charged deception, a narrower,
more easily defined legal concept. In Pfizer, however, although the "entertainment"
(as opposed to "information") advertisements did not deceive consumers as to any
scientific testing, the FTC nevertheless stated that a claim without a prior reasonable
basis was unfair. As to the FTC's antitrust jurisdiction, unfair competition was
thought, until S & H, to be connected with the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws.
"Unfairness" in its application was thus not quite as open-ended as the history of
the Wheeler-Lea Amendment and subsequent cases might indicate.
27. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Compare Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), where he
defined "obscenity" as "hard-core pornography." The Justice added: "I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it... .. Id.
28. Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967). A tying arrangement is an agreement whereby a seller
will sell the desired product-e.g., gasoline--only if the buyer or gas station will
in addition buy other less desirable items.
29. Gellman v. FTAC, 290 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1961); Peerless Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 284 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961); Chas. A.
Brewer & Sons v. FTC, 158 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1946); Kritzik v. FTC, 125 F.2d
351 (7th Cir. 1942); National Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 610 (1939). A lottery may also be held a violation of section
5 if contrary to any local law. See note 20 supra.
30. See Rayex Corp. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 1963). The court
of appeals refused to enforce the FTC's cease-and-desist order on the ground of
insufficient evidence. Id. at 295.
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tailers fail to disclose to credit customers that their negotiable notes
could be assigned to a third party to whom the buyer would then be
indebted and against whom the buyer's claims or defenses might
not be available.3 1 Furthermore, the practice of routinely assigning
such instruments was held inherently unfair.3 2 Despite the back-
ground of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, however, cases continued to
turn almost entirely on questions of unfair competition or consumer
deception,33 with little consideration of practices which, although not
deceptive, nevertheless might be unfair to consumers.
In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (S & H),3 4 the Supreme
Court finally recognized the legislative grant of power to develop
a consumer protection standard of unfairness. The Court not only
rejected the Fifth Circuit's imposition of "judicial guidelines""6 for
determining fairness, but confirmed the FTC's broad discretion to
measure practices against the "elusive, but congressionally-mandated
standard. 3 6 In this case, S & H, the world's largest trading stamp
company, had attempted to eliminate commercial stamp exchanges
where consumers could acquire, sell, or trade green stamps without
a store purchase. S & H also attempted to prohibit retailers from
recycling green stamps by means of unauthorized merchandise re-
demptions. These actions not only would have increased the retail-
ers' demand for green stamps, but would have either obligated con-
sumers to continue shopping at those chain stores that dispensed the
stamps or limited the utility of consumers' unredeemed stamps.8 7
Although the FTC and the trial examiner confined their decisions
31. All-State Indus., Inc. v. FTC, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG.
REP. 18,740, at 21,105 (FTC 1969), enforced, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963); see notes 57-60
infra and accompanying text. See also Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 20,056,
at 22,032 (FTC July 11, 1972); General Motors Corp., 53 F.T.C. 1239 (1957)
(dismissing a complaint against the "your Chevrolet knows the difference" ad-
vertising campaign, which was held not deceptive even though it alleged that
identical replacement parts made by manufacturers other than Chevrolet might
perform less dependably than Chevrolet parts).
34. 405 U.S. 233 (1972), modifying 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970).
35. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had said:
To be the type of practice that the Commission has the power to declare
"unfair" the act complained of must fall within one of the following
types of violations: (1) a per se violation of antitrust policy; (2) a vio-
lation of the letter of either the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman
Acts; or (3) a violation of the spirit of these Acts as recognized by
the Supreme Court. . . . 432 F.2d at 150.
36. 405 U.S. at 244.
37. Id. at 236-37. See generally Note, Trading Stamps, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1090 (1962).
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to the issue of unfair competiton,3 8 the Supreme Court indicated
that economic injury to the consumer independently could result
in a section 5 violation. 9 Thus, the Court ensured that the FTC's
broad discretionary powers would be equally available to its con-
sumer protection efforts.4 0
The S & H decision confirmed the Commission's own view of
"unfairness" as a dynamic, analytical concept with which the FTC
could create "a new body of law"'" adaptable to changing needs and
conditions. After S & H, according to one FTC official, practices
do not have to cause injury to be held unfair, but need only be im-
moral, unethical, or oppressive.4 2 The General Counsel of the Com-
38. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,862, at 23,219 (FTC 1967) (trial examiner), [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. f 18,449, at 20,792 (FTC 1968) (Commission final order).
39. 405 U.S. at 239. The importance of this decision is two-fold. Not only
did the Court confirm the FTC's role in consumer protection cases, but by hold-
ing that the Commission could proscribe practices as unfair even though there
was no violation of the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws, the Court also ex-
panded the FTC's antitrust jurisdiction. Id.
40. It is difficult to imagine a looser set of jurisdictional restrictions than
S & H's. In addition to challenging unfair advertising practices, the FTC has
formulated plans under the S & H mandate to ban the holder-in due-course doctrine,
see text accompanying note 32 supra, and to investigate the credit market, debtor's
rights, and garnishment practices. Pitofsky Interview AA-3. Such loose standards
of unfairness may even carry FTC regulation beyond antitrust or consumer pro-
tection orders. Recently a petition was filed with the FTC against two paper
mills, alleging that excessive pollution was an unfair trade practice and an unre-
vealed material fact affecting consumer purchases. See 563 BNA AnTRusT &
TRADE REG. REP. A-20 (1972). At the very least, "excessive" pollution, implying
the avoidance of required abatement costs, creates a competitive advantage and
arguably is subject to the FTC's public policy balancing test.
In addition to the novel economic issue, this petition poses the serious ques-
tion whether the FTC can legitimately decide issues that affect not only sellers and
potential buyers of consumer goods, but all facets of society. Since administrative
agencies are created to infuse an often highly technical expertise into governmental
decision-making, they would seem ill-equipped to make decisions with such poten-
tially wide ramifications outside their narrow area of regulation. See Colgate-
Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949); Hastings Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINIS-
TRATivE LAw TRErISE §§ 1.05, 2.05 (1958).
41. All-State Indus., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. % 18,740,
at 21,105 (FTC 1969). See also FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 696
(2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
42. Address by Gerald Thain, Assistant Director for National Advertising,
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, reprinted in part in 558 tNA ANra usT
& TRADE REG. REP. A-14 (1972). In quoting from the Statement of Basis and
Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, 16 C.F.R. § 408 (1972), which covers the
unfair advertising and labeling of cigarettes, S & H and Pfizer stated that the
question of an act's unfairness was to be determined by these factors: "(1)
[whether the act is] within . . . the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or
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mission has envisioned an equally open-ended test where the FTC
would balance the business reasons for a questioned act against any
public values it deems relevant.43
THE Pfizer CASE
The FTC's view of its own power was formally expressed in
Pfizer, Inc.44  In Pfizer, the FTC challenged television advertise-
ments portraying a tanned, bikini-clad model applying a sun-burn
product while cooing that "Un-Bum anesthetizes nerves" and "re-
lieves pain fast. '45 Similar radio claims were also challenged. The
staff complaint, besides charging deception, alleged that Pfizer com-
mitted unfair acts by advertising "Un-Bum's" pain-relieving quali-
ties without well-controlled scientific studies or tests to substantiate
the claims." 6 Although the FTC held that well-controlled scientific
tests were not necessary to avoid liability under section 5,47 the
Commission cautioned that a positive claim without a prior reason-
able basis would be unfair to the consumer because such a claim
would impair his ability to make a rational product choice and would
force him to bear the economic risk that the product might not per-
form as advertised.48 Making an unsubstantiated claim would also
be unfair to competitors, who, although able to compete on the ba-
sis of price, service, or quality, might otherwise lose prospective cus-
tomers enticed by the representations. The rationale of Pfizer was
clear: the economic risk that a product might not yield the expected
result should be borne by the manufacturer through the prior sub-
stantiation of advertising claims, rather than by the consumer who
other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers
or competitors or other businessmen." FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972); Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,056, at 22,032
(FTC July 11, 1972).
43. Statement of Richard Dietrich, FTC General Counsel (Panel Discussion,
ABA Antitrust Law Section), reprinted in part in 577 BNA ANTaRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. A-9 (1972); cf. Alberty v. FrC, 182 F.2d 36, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
This parallels the earlier extreme view of a Commission with the power to proceed
against any conduct it feels is contrary to public policy. See note 25 supra
and accompanying text.
44. 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 20,056, at 22,029 (FTC July 11, 1972).
45. The following claims were challenged: (1) "New Un-Bum actually an-
esthetizes nerves in sensitive sunburn skin"; (2) Un-Burn "contains the same local
anesthetic doctors often use"; and (3) "Un-Burn relieves pain fast." Pfizer, Inc.,
[1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,209, at 21,388 (FTC 1970)
(proposed complaint).
46. Id.
47. Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP 20,056, at 22,036 (FTC July 11, 1972).
48. Id. at 22,029.
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relies upon those claims and who would suffer economic loss should
the claims prove false.49
The Reasonable Basis Test
In establishing the "reasonable basis" test, the FTC explained
in Pfizer that the standards against which the advertiser's actions
must be measured are to be formulated in each case. Thus the
type and amount of data required to provide a reasonable basis for
a claim would vary with the type and specificity of the advertise-
ment, the nature of the product, the possible consequences of a false
claim, the type and accessibility of evidence, and the likely reliance
on the claim by consumers. 50 A safety claim involving a poten-
tially dangerous product would be held to a higher standard of rea-
sonableness than, for example, an efficacy or performance claim that
at most would result in a small economic loss. For some poten-
tially hazardous products, the only reasonable basis would be scien-
tific or medical tests.51 In other cases, studies of scientific, medical,
or trade literature, an analysis based on general medical knowledge,
or even the experienced and informed judgment of experts might
be sufficient.52
Despite the FTC's attempt to clarify its standards, an adver-
tiser's obligations under the reasonable basis test are unclear. To
decide whether his proposed advertisement has a reasonable basis,
the advertiser apparently must first examine the claims in terms of
the variable factors announced in Pfizer. He should then weigh the
substantiating data against specific values he has assigned to each
factor and against the relative importance of each factor generally,
though the FTC could go through the same procedure and still reach
49. See id.
50. Id. at 22,034.
51. See id.
52. Lest the FrC become embroiled in a battle of testing experts, however,
the Commission was quick to point out that its limited role would be "to determine
the existence and general quality of the tests and a threshold determination as to the
reasonableness of reliance thereon, rather than an attempt to conclusively determine
the adequacy of the tests." Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,056, at 22,035 n.22
(FTC July 11, 1972).
Since the FTC's concern is with the method of marketing, the ultimate per-
formance of the product as advertised is not enough to avoid section 5 prosecution.
See note 48 supra and accompanying text. Although tests conducted and experts
consulted after the representation is first made are irrelevant to the prior sub-
stantiation complaint, the Commission nonetheless determined that even subsequent
testing failed to prove "Un-Burn's" anesthetizing claims. These tests compared
"Un-Burn" with a neutral substance rather than with the level of effectiveness
represented in its commercials. Id. at 22,035 n.23.
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the opposite result."
In addition to being difficult to apply, the Pfizer test may ex-
ceed the Commission's legislative mandate. Despite anticipation that
some acts would be unfair and not deceptive,54 it is apparent that
Congress did not expect that the legality of an advertisement would
turn on factors other than truth or falsity, as was the case in Pfizer.
Senator Wheeler, one of the authors of the 1938 Amendment, when
asked what the FTC could do under the proposed legislation about
the hypothetical claim, "my rayon is the best in the world, superior
to any other," replied:
If [the manufacturer] said in his advertisement that it was the best
in the world, and he was honestly of the opinion that it was the best
in the world, the Federal Trade Commission could ordinarily not do
anything about it . . . . The object of the proposed legislation is
not to stop the issuing of exaggerated opinions with reference to one's
own articles. 55
53. The Pfizer facts may be used to illustrate the application of the new
FTC standard. Although safety tests were made on both animals and humans, no
efficacy or performance tests on humans were conducted prior to the advertising
campaign stressing "Un-Bum's" anesthetic effects. Further, the efficacy tests
employed were not persuasive; injections of benzocaine into guinea pigs could
hardly substantiate claims that surface applications anesthetized human nerves.
On the contrary, there is evidence which indicates that benzocaine as a treatment
for pain from bums is no more effective than cold water or the neutral jelly in
which "Un-Bum's" "active" ingredient was marketed. CONSUMERS UNION, THE
MEDICINE SHOW 136-37 (1963).
Pfizer's use of clinical data to show that benzocaine and menthol had been
used by doctors for at least fifty years in treating sunburn pain, 3 TRADE REo.
Rm. 1 19,614, at 21,656 (FTC 1971) (trial examiner's decision to dismiss
charges), is equally vulnerable under the reasonable basis test. Pfizer's his-
torical search may have been so limited as to be unreasonable, or the literature
may have been too ambiguous or contradictory to support the claim. Conclusions
drawn from the reviewed material may have been unreasonable if only the in-
gredients were analyzed and not the final product combination. Further grounds
for complaint would exist if all the potential uses of the product were not investi-
gated. With "Un-Bum," for example, the effect of the product on various skin
types and on bums of different degrees should have been thoroughly examined.
3 TRADE REG. REP. f 20,056, at 22,037 n.30 (FTC July 11, 1972). Finally, the
qualifications and potential biases of investigators could be questioned to impeach the
reasonableness of the advertiser's effort, since the FTC demands at a minimum
that significant resources and trained personnel be devoted to the research and
testing functions.
54. See Hearings on H.R. 3143 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937), reprinted in Dunn, supra
note 20, at 467 (statement of Commissioner Davis that companies may engage in
many unfair practices, such as bribery, which are not deceptive).
55. 80 CoNG. REc. 6592 (1936) (emphasis added). Senator Wheeler's rea-
soning would seem automatically to preclude an attack on that part of the "Un-
Bum" advertisement that claimed the product went to work "fast." Similarly,
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Senator Wheeler went on to state that after the amendment, the
FTC could investigate if the advertisement was a statement of fact
which could be demonstrated as true or false; but if a statement was
made where there could be differences of opinion, the FTC should
not proceed. 56 Although the Commission was to have wide lati-
tude in defining and preventing unfair acts, these acts were ulti-
mately to be judged against the truth insofar as it was ascertainable.
Although apparently not contemplated by Congress, the Pfizer
reasonable basis test was foreshadowed by several FTC and lower
words such as "easy," "perfect," ."amazing," "prime," "wonderful," and "ex-
cellenV' have in the past been regarded as lawful trade puffing. Carlay Co. v.
FTC, 153 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1946). See note 12 supra.
During the Senate debate on the 1938 Amendment, Senator Wheeler stated:
[1]f the manufacturer said, "My car is the best car on the market for the
money," there would be a vast difference of opinion in the general pub-
lic's mind as to whether it was or not. . . . It would be a very difficult
thing to prove that the car was not just what the manufacturer said it
was. Those are things which are generally recognized by the courts as
not capable of being reached by any law. 80 CoNa. REc. 6592 (1936).
Senator Norris added:
[That] such a statement would clearly bring the automobile manufacturer
under . .. the bill . . . technically . . . may be right. As a practical
proposition, however, it is of no consequence, because any man of ex-
perience knows that he never could obtain the enforcement of a cease-
and-desist order . . . . Id. at 6592-93 (1936).
Congress thus did not directly consider the implications of the Act on trade
puffing, since in practical terms, the contradictory testimony would foreclose the
Commission from satisfying the burden of proving falsity or deception. The
draftsmen of the amendment clearly did not anticipate a reasonable basis doc-
trine that would shift the burden of coming forward with evidence and would de-
clare a section 5 violation based on the very existence of contradictory evidence.
But the new doctrine could be construed to prohibit this previously exempt trade
"puffing."
The FTC may already have acted in this direction. There is very little dif-
ference between the hypothetical rayon claim, thought beyond FTC regulation,
and the claims of superior headache relief and automobile handling capability
currently under attack. See notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text. The
Guidelines on Advertising Substantiation, published to ease compliance with
new FTC orders, also seem to conflict with Congressional understanding of the
FTCA. To distinguish Senator Wheeler's lawful "exaggerated opinions" from
presently proscribed unfair representations necessitates drawing a very thin line.
The prohibition contained in the Guidelines seems to fall somewhere between the
two categories. See, e.g., Guideline Number 9: "Advertisers should avoid exagger-
ated statements and demonstrations which reasonably could be misconstrued by con-
sumers, 'dangling' comparatives, and any intentional distortion of fact, as well as un-
substantiated claims of uniqueness." Guidelines on Advertising Substantiation, re-
printed in 588 BNA ArrrrlusT & TRADE Rnr. REP. A-10 (1972). An example
of a "dangling comparative" might be the claim by Phillips tablets---"they're
smaller, but they're stronger." Advertisers apparently can no longer announce
that their products are qualitatively "superior," comparatively "better," or even
different from competing products without a sufficient prior basis. See notes
79-82 infra and accompanying text.
56. 80 CONG. REc. 6592 (1936).
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court decisions. In H.W. Kirchner,"' an advertisement claimed that
an "invisible" inflatable swimming aid would make the wearer "un-
sinkable" when it was slipped inside a bathing suit. The FTC over-
ruled the trial examiner by holding that the "invisibility" claim was
a hyperbole "too far-fetched" to warrant intervention, but the Com-
mission then upheld the examiner's finding that the "unsinkable"
claim was deceptive.58  In essence, the FTC treated separately those
claims involving potential health and safety hazards:
While we are not deciding the instant case on such a ground, we are
inclined to think that an advertiser is under a duty, before he makes
any representation which, if false, could cause injury to the health
or personal safety of the user . . ., to make reasonable inquiry into
the truth or falsity of the representation. 59
Unlike Pfizer, the Commission in Kirchner did not advocate a rea-
sonable basis test based on a detailed evaluation of the marketing
method and risk factors. Rather, under Kirchner, substantiation
would be sufficient only if it satisfied a reasonably prudent busi-
nessman, acting in good faith, that the claim was true.10
In Tashof v. FTC,"' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit enforced an FTC order which proscribed prac-
tices that might result in economic injury similar to that discussed
in Pfizer. The New York Jewelry Company had claimed to be a
discount seller of eyeglasses-a claim the FTC held was false, after
discovering that the company, through various "bait and switch"
techniques, had sold fewer than 10 pairs out of a total of 1,400 for
the advertised price of $7.50.62 The cease-and-desist order prohib-
57. 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963).
58. Id. at 1290; see notes 138-39 infra and accompanying text.
59. 63 F.T.C. at 1294. Compare Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE RE . REP. 1 20,056,
at 22,034 (FTC July 11, 1972).
60. By recommending a reasonably prudent businessman standard, the FTC
apparently made the assumption that a greater or lesser amount of proof would
satisfy a businessman than would satisfy an average reasonable man. The rapid
expansion of products liability might indicate that a businessman would be more
wary of product claims than the average consumer. See Hansen v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Note, Products Lia-
bility and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DuKx L.J. 837. If, on the other
hand, the standard assumes a reasonable businessman will be persuaded by less
evidence, thus making it easier to satisfy the Commission's test, the Kirchner
standard would be less rigorous than the Pfizer test.
61. 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
62. Leon A. Tashof, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. % 18,606,
at 20,941 (FTC 1968), enforced, 437 F.2d" 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The "bait and switch" technique is one whereby a seller advertises a product
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ited the company from advertising "discount prices" in the future
without first conducting a "statistically significant survey" in its trade
area to show that the prevailing price was "substantially" higher
than New York Jewelry's.6 3 Unlike Kirchner, the Tashof representa-
tions only involved the price of the product and the risk of economic
injury. There were no allegations that any of the eyeglasses did
not meet advertised quality standards. The consumers' reliance 4
and possibly the nature of the product as one necessary to those with
poor eyesight were the only Pfizer variables present which militated for
a high degree of prior substantiation. 6 Furthermore, a Kirchner
health or safety problem would not be involved except insofar as
the advertisement induced customers with poor eyesight to take a
potentially hazardous downtown trip.
BEYOND Pfizer
The FTC has indicated that Pfizer's reasonable basis require-
ment is not the limit of its intended consumer protection effort. 66
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,67 the FTC required substantiation
by scientific tests of claims that the "Wide Oval" tire was "safe," 68
at an unusually low price to attract the customer. Then the potential buyer is
either persuaded to make "the better buy" when the salesman points out all the
deficiencies in the advertised special, or he is forced to buy a second product to
take advantage of the bargain. See also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 3
TRADE REG. REP. 20,060, at 22,041 (FTC July 27, 1972), in which the FTC
is seeking to force A & P Food Stores to cease and desist from advertising specials
with very limited quantities of the advertised products on hand in each store.
63. 437 F.2d at 713. A survey may be the only acceptable substantiation for
"discount" advertisements. Id.; General Motors Corp., 3 TRADE RE. REP. 20,120,
at 22,103 (FTC Oct. 12, 1972) (proposed order would require advertised
economy characteristics to be backed by "qualitative data based on a statistically
valid sample, or other appropriate substantiating material").
However, Judge Robb, dissenting in Tashof, argued: "Mbe Commission
exceeds its authority when it requires [the New York Jewelry Company] to con-
duct a 'statistically significant survey' . . . . This requirement shifts to NYJC the
burden of proving its innocence; and . . .might subject NYJC to heavy civil
penalties even if its advertisement is true." 437 F.2d at 715 (dissenting opinion).
See notes 144-45 inf ra and accompanying text.
64. On the, other hand, it is arguable that the initial reliance on low prices
only brought consumers to the store to be subjected to bait-and-switch salesmanship
and thus did not directly induce any purchases.
65. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
66. It should be noted, however, that the dismissal prevented any immediate
testing of the doctrine in court, a circumstance which caused one Commissioner to
dissent from the disposition of the case. Pfizer, Inc., 3 TPADE REG. REP. 20,056,
at 22,039 (FTC July 11, 1972).
67. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,112, at 22,077 (FTC Sept. 22, 1972). For a
history of Firestone's "safe-tire" controversy, see BisHoP 132-35.
68. 3 TADE REG. REP. 20,112, at 22,081 (FTC Sept. 22, 1972). It should
be noted that there were two dissents from this position. Id. at 22,088-94.
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even though a general scientific testing requirement had been re-
jected in Pfizer.0 Also, the FTC recently has challenged repre-
sentations which do not involve specific safety claims and which,
under Pfizer, would not require a high degree of substantiation.70
The Commission has issued proposed complaints challenging am-
biguous advertising claims 71 by automobile manufacturers.72 In
The Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573 (Oct. 27, 1972), re-
printed in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6021-53 (1972), created an independent
Consumer Product Safety Commission with power to accumulate and disseminate
information concerning personal injuries caused by specific products, to pass man-
datory safety standards, and to ban products creating imminent hazards to con-
sumers. Despite the assertion that the FTC is primarily an investigative and not a
regulatory body, National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343
(D.D.C. 1972), regulation by the FTC of safety claims is not expected to de-
crease. See Hercules, Inc., 3 TnnAD REG. REP. % 20,131, at 22,120 (FTC Nov. 1,
1972) (proposed complaints against pesticide manufacturers).
69. In National Petroleum Refiner's Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C.
1972), the FTC was denied substantive rule-making power. Thus in Firestone
the FTC stated that the scope of the reasonable basis test was limited "at this time" to
determinations on a case-by-case basis. 3 TRAE REG. REP. 20,112, at 22,081
(FTC Sept. 22, 1972). By pointedly restricting its role to ad hoc decision-
making, the Commission might be looking forward to the overruling of National
Petroleum, either on appeal or by legislative fiat. See proposed Consumer Prod-
uct Warranties and FTC Improvements Act, S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 17,887 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971). The National
Petroleum decision dealt a serious blow to the Commission's planned enforcement
program by holding that, unlike the SEC, the FTC had no authority to issue sub-
stantive regulations enforceable in court. Thus, when the Commission promul-
gates a rule under section 6(g) of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970)-for
example, declaring the failure to post octane numbers on gasoline pumps unfair
and deceptive-the rule is open to full-scale judicial review in each case. The
district court in National Petroleum even went so far as to state that the FTC was
created expressly as an investigative and not as a regulatory body. 340 F. Supp. at
1345. See generally Federal Administrative Law Developments-1972, supra note 13.
The broad language of the S & H decision may indicate that the FTC will get a
sympathetic audience when the Supreme COurt evaluates the Commission's rule-
making power. In S & H the Court approvingly quoted from a trade regulation rule.
See note 42 supra. If and when the FTC's rule-making authority is confirmed,
the Commission may be willing to codify "reasonable basis" in order to clarify
the boundaries of FTC regulation.
70. Although there is some indication that health and safety claims may be
treated as a separate advertising category, see text accompanying note 59 supra, the
high degree of prior substantiation required in Firestone might easily be under-
stood by a cursory evaluation of the Pfizer factors. The "safe tire" claims were
specific, citing statistics instead of using an entertainment format; the product was
one upon which the personal safety of the user depended; and the supporting
evidence was peculiarly accessible to the manufacturer. See text accompanying
note 50 supra.
71. These ambiguous representations-advertisements conveying both true
and misleading claims--currently cause most of the FTC litigation. See Gellhorn,
supra note 13, at 563 (1969). It might be argued that by adding misleading
"secondary" meanings to a true statement, the advertiser is precluded from claiming
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these cases, the FTC's challenge, although couched in "reasonable
basis" language, necessarily focuses on what is actually truth in the
context of the advertisement. For example, a claim that a certain
make of automobile "never quit" in 130,000 miles is meaningless
until the auto-maker defines "quit. '73
Claims of Uniqueness
Perhaps the most important substantive innovation to arise from
the new reasonable basis test has been the challenge to uniqueness
representations. The FTC recently issued complaints against the
major manufacturers of analgesics, each of which had made var-
ious claims of superior pain relief and unique performance. 74  The
complaints did not charge falsity, but alleged that no reasonable
basis existed for unqualified claims of therapeutic differences among
products or even for assertions that the products were superior to
plain aspirin. The mere making of these claims, at least in an in-
formational setting, implied they had been "established," when, ac-
cording to the FTC,
[t]here is a general background of ignorance in the scientific com-
munity on how analgesics work. Tests controdict [sic] one another.
In light of the great mass of contradictory data, to make unqualified
claims against that background is unfair.75
to be acting in good faith, and is thus subjected to liability under the good faith test
suggested by Kirchner. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
72. One challenged advertisement reads in part:
There's only one way, really, to find out what a Chevy Vega is all about,
and that's to drive one. Road & Track Magazine drove one and wound
up saying . . . 'Vega is beyond a doubt the best handling passenger car
ever built in the U.S.' Notice they didn't say the best handling little
car ... or the best handling economy car, but simply the best handling
passenger car .... [W]ho'd expect an economical little car like Vega
to be a hero on the highway?" General Motors Corp., 3 TnRnn REG. REP.
20,120, at 22,103 (FTC Oct. 12, 1972) (proposed complaint).
The FTC also recently issued a proposed complaint against a Ford Motor Company
advertisement that implied Ford's side-guard beams are as strong as highway guard-
rails. Ford Motor Co., 3 TRADE kEG. REP. 1 20,218, at 22,216 (FTC Feb. 8, 1973).
73. See 593 BNA AN'rrRusT & TRADE Run. REP. A-I, A-2 (1972) (adver-
tisement for Toyota for which the FTC has demanded substantiation).
74. Bristol-Myers Co., 3 TRADE Rno. REP. 1 20,263, at 22,292 (FTC Feb.
23, 1973) (involving the manufacturers of "Anacin," "Bufferin," "Excedrin,"
"Bayer," "Cope," "Vanquish," and "Midol"). The investigation behind these
complaints has lasted over ten years. See FTC News Release, 3 TRmE REG. REP.
10,117, at 18,603 (June 27, 1962). However, since less than ten percent of
all initiated investigations even reach the proposed complaint stage, it would not
have been atypical for the FTC to have quietly dropped the case. See Address by
FTC Executive Director Menzies, reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,138, at
55,228 (June 12, 1972).
75. 560 BNA ANrrrwsT & TRADE RE. RE'. A-3 (1972) (announcement of
proposed analgesics complaint by FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection Director
Pitofsky).
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The theory of this complaint-that a claim for which there is con-
flicting evidence is necessarily unfair-makes the reasonable basis
requirement look more like a requirement of conclusive proof. Even
Pfizer did not go so far as to suggest that a conflict or general
ignorance among the experts would prohibit a product claim based
only on one school of thought. On the contrary, the Commission
in Pfizer suggested that conflict in the medical literature was insuffi-
cient proof that "no reasonable basis" existed when the advertiser
was attempting to draw on clinical experience."6 Should the FTC
accept the theory of the analgesics complaint, any claim contradicted
by a credible minority expert or validated by less than conclusive
evidence could be held insufficiently substantiated. 77  The problems
with this approach are apparent. If one accepts the premise that a
large enough group of experts would probably have difficulty agree-
ing on anything, 78 one could envision every affirmative product
claim subject to challenge on the basis of every competitor's product
claim. Every headache remedy would not be permitted to advertise
greater pain relief qualities than all the rest; but one product could
assert its superiority so long as the competitors conceded the claim,
an unlikely occurrence. Making every product representation con-
sistent with all other competing advertising claims would appear to
be an impossible goal for even the most energetic, abundantly fi-
nanced Commission.
In addition to these difficulties, the arguments permitting chal-
76. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,056, at 22,039. Although the Supreme Court has
given the FTC the power to define unfairness in each case, the Commission may
finally have indicated that, even after Pfizer, the unfairness concept is not bound-
less. Rather the FTC could place self-imposed restrictions on its jurisdiction in
the form of a rule, should the rule-making power be upheld. See note 69 supra.
Thus, the National Petroleum case, if upheld, might actually force future, less
activist Commissions to take jurisdiction in questionable cases or at least to exer-
cise a case-by-case discretion, instead of allowing the FTC to fall back on a limit-
ing trade regulation rule.
77. By issuing a complaint against General Motors for advertising that "Vega
is the best handling passenger car ever built in the United States," see note 72
supra, even though the quotation was directly attributed to an independent Road
& Track magazine study, the FTC may have already indicated its acceptance of the
conclusive proof theory.
78. See 560 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE Ra. REP. A-3 (1972) (response of
Bristol-Myers' products president to the proposed complaints issued against anal-
gesic manufacturers). Compare McKay v. State, 235 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1950), where, in ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence-the results of
a Harger Drunkometer test-in a criminal trial before a jury, the court asserted: "In
all probability a scientist may be found who will disagree with practically every gen-
erally accepted scientific theory. We will take judicial knowledge of the scientific
fact that the earth is round. At the same time, we know there are still individuals
who claim to be scientists who have other theories. . . ." Id. at 174.
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lenges of uniqueness claims based on contradictory evidence may
lead to an attack on product differentiation in all advertising. The
FTC has long recognized that large firms in consumer goods indus-
tries tend to manufacture similar products and create artificial dis-
tinctions through advertising to affect price and demand. Convinc-
ing the consumer that one product is somehow faster, stronger, more
pleasant, or more economical than all competing products is the
primary goal of advertising.79 Toothpastes, deodorants, cleansers,
soaps, and detergents generally are priced from five to twenty times
the cost of production; forty percent of the product price is spent on
"creating" product differentiation.8" Pfizer touched on the problem
of artificially differentiated products by warning that a manufacturer
who utilizes only trade information gathered by competitors has no
reasonable basis for advertising claims unless the prior testing in-
volved an identical combination of ingredients.8 ' Of course, the
admission that identical products exist negates claims of differentia-
tion. The advertiser could avoid this Pfizer dilemma by making
tests on his own, a positive end in itself according to the reasonable
basis doctrine.82  Nevertheless, in that adumbrative world beyond
79. See, e.g., BisHOP 105-22; NMR REPORT 21-24; Thain, Drug Advertising
and Drug Abuse-The Role of the FTC, 26 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J 487, 489
(1971); Travers 555; Comment, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of FTC
Regulation, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1097.
80. NADER REPORT 21. See also Travers 555; Comment, The First Amend-
ment and Consumer Protection: Commercial Advertising as Protected Speech, 50
ORE. L. REv. 177, 183 (1971).
One example of advertising which creates nonexistent distinctions occurs in
the gasoline industry. There is so little difference among premium brands that the
major oil companies even exchange gas with each other to eliminate the effect of
fluctuations in demand. Shell Oil Company has an advertisement showing the
Shell-fueled car, with "platformate" in the gasoline, crashing through a paper cur-
tain set up where the car without the Shell ingredient had come to a stop. The
advertisement of course does not mention that all brands of gasoline contain the
very non-unique ingredient platformate. BIsHoP 112-13, 172-73. See also 32
CONSUMER REP. 360 (1967) (describing the advertising success of Clorox, which,
although identical to most other bleaches, has been able not only to dominate the
market but also to charge ten to fifteen percent more for the product than com-
peting brands).
81. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,056, at 22,037 n.30.
82. However, private-label manufacturers and small-time producers who ad-
vertise on a comparison basis with branded products are more vulnerable than
larger corporations, since they can no longer rely merely on whatever substan-
tiation their larger competitor has. Nor can these smaller concerns afford the
large testing staffs available to the wealthier corporations. The FTC's protection
of the consumer might ironically in some cases inhibit its twin function of en-
couraging competition. But see 517 BNA ANnTrius'r & TRADE REG. REP. A-1 (1971)
(Bureau of Competition Director's belief that informal advertising substantiation
program will increase competition by making complaints against the larger adver-
tisers more common and easier to justify).
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Pfizer, one must question whether any advertisement which does
no more than attempt to create an artificial product distinction can
withstand the FTC's rigorous "unfairness" challenge.
Nonrational Appeals
Another advertising technique to which the Pfizer decision
might easily be extended is the nonrational appeal-that delib-
erately uninformative advertisement which causes the consumer to
buy a product without regard to price or quality. The FTC could
demand substantiation for such "claims" and thus force the adver-
tiser to attempt to justify the advertisement's implications.83  For
example, substantiation might be required for statements that a
mouthwash or toothpaste enhances sex appeal, that a cold cream
restores youthful beauty, or that possessing a certain automobile
revitalizes the owner's dating prowess.84 Some observers have ad-
vocated complaints against such nonrational advertisements, 85 and
one FTC official has already recognized this possibility.8" The ques-
83. The FTC has not confined the extension of Pfizer to explicit uniqueness
representations; instead, the Commission appears to include implied uniqueness
claims. See Ford Motor Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,218, at 22,216 (FTC
Feb. 8, 1973) (proposed complaint against implied claims that Ford's side-guard
beams were as strong as highway guardrails); ITT Continental Baking Co., 3
TRADE REO. REP. 19,539, at 21,613 (FTC 1971) (proposed complaint attacked
implied nutritional uniqueness claims for "Wonderbread"); speech by Gerald
Thain, reprinted in part in 558 BNA ANrrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-14 (1972)
(noting the trend toward prohibition of implied uniqueness claims); 570 BNA
ANaeiiusT & TRADE REG. REP. B-3 (1972) (recognizing the challenge in the
"Wonderbread" case as the beginning of an important trend); cf. Alberty v. FTC,
182 F.2d 3.6, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
84. See Guidelines on Advertising Substantiation, Nos. 7, 11, reprinted in
588 BNA ANTrrRusr & TRADE REG. REP. A-10 (1972). Although the sexual
"aura" of the "Un-Burn" advertisements was probative only of the entertainment
as opposed to the scientific character of the representations, at least one com-
mentator has challenged all use of sexual appeals. See Thain, supra note 79, at
499. FTC official Thain "would question the fairness of any advertisement which
exploits the aspirations of married women by representing that a product. . . can
and will be effective in making them attractive and exciting to their husbands."
Id.
85. See Alexander, Federal Regulation of False Advertising, 17 U. KAN. L.
REv. 573, 582-84 (1969). The proscription of nonrational appeals would elimi-
nate "pastoral scenes and nubile maidens cavorting on beaches, pleasant scenes to
behold, but suggestive of no rational basis for the preference of the product."
Id. at 584. See also Thain, supra note 9, at 621-22; Comment, supra note 79.
86. In response to the "still-unanswered question" whether advertising that
induces nonrational consumer purchases is unfair under section 5, Bureau of
Consumer Protection Director Robert Pitofsky stated:
Again I suppose the staff could recommend a complaint like that. I be-
lieve any such case would be unwise. The definition of a nonrational
experience is so elusive that I wouldn't know how to propose enforcing a
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tion of regulation in this area may become increasingly acute if the
reasonable basis requirement ironically causes advertisers, in avoid-
ing the prior substantiation of factual claims, to abandon informa-
tion advertising in favor of mood or entertainment commercials.87
Should the FTC proceed against nonrational advertisements, new
problems will arise. The FTC will be forced to define "nonrational"
and to formulate the reasonable basis standards, if any, for such non-
rational advertisements.
In addition to "wandering into a semantic swamp"' 8 of adver-
tising regulations, the FTC may also be severely curtailing advertis-
ing creativity. If nonrational advertisements as well as attempts
to create artificial product distinctions and claims of uniqueness
were proscribed, advertising could become a burdensome endeavor,
were it to survive at all. If the FTC's power is unlimited after
Pfizer, the Wall Street law office may even replace Madison Avenue
as the creative center of advertising.
PROBLEMS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF Pfizer
The Advertising Substantiation Program
Although the FTC has sought to strengthen its formal enforce-
ment procedure, informal proceedings still account for the vast ma-
jority of the FTC's workload.89 The most important of these in-
formal programs relating to the reasonable basis doctrine has been
the advertisement substantiation plan-typically challenging the
product claims of an entire industry at one time9°-which demands
rule like that. I think we have to rely in the long run on the good sense
of consumers in resisting those kinds of appeals, or at least insisting on
some hard evidence of price and quality when they purchase the product.
Pitofsky Interview AA-5.
87. See BISHOP 111-12; Thain, supra note 79, at 488-89.
88. Austern, What is "Unfair Advertising"? 26 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 659,
667 (1971). See Thain, supra note 9, at 621-22.
89. Since the costs of litigation exceed the costs of negotiating voluntary
compliance, the FTC settles most cases short of adjudication. ABA REPORT 22.
Aside from the. more traditional weapons of informal compliance, the ability of
the FTC to negotiate favorable dispositions-especially under the consent order
procedure, 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35" (1972), promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1970)-should not be underestimated. Given the increasing power the
Commission has assumed, large corporations in the future will be making frequent
reappearances. In 1972 each of the proposed respondents in the analgesics cases
was also challenged by the FTC for other totally unrelated activity. Thus, given
the practicalities of the situation, corporations will want to emphasize coopera-
tion and may be willing to make tradeoffs in certain areas in order to maintain a
close working relationship with the FTC staff.
90. E.g., 570 BNA ANTIRrusT & TlumE RuG. REP. A-9 (1972) (soap and
detergent products); 548 BNA A,,rTRUST & TRADE REo. REP. A-$ (1972) (cold
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that written substantiation for advertisement claims be submitted
to the FTC upon request. 1 As originally envisioned, the plan's
primary purpose was educational-to provide the consumer with in-
formation he would otherwise not get and thus to facilitate rational
product choices. 92 Paralleling the Pfizer decision, the plan's second-
ary purpose was to encourage advertisers to substantiate their claims
before making public representations.9 3 This function assumed that
individuals and consumer groups would study the documenting evi-
dence and exert economic pressure on derelict manufacturers.94
Therefore, to protect its good will, each manufacturer would adopt
more stringent prior substantiation procedures.
Advertising substantiation has not been successful. Despite
the FTC's assertion that advertisers have "tightened their policies,""5
it is apparent the plan has not fulfilled its purposes. The Commis-
sion has reported that the first four industries investigated-the mak-
ers of automobiles, air conditioners, television sets, and electric shav-
ers-responded with volumes of data, but admitted that two-thirds of
the information was either questionable or too technical to under-
stand.90 The makers of cold remedies delayed the release of their
and cough remedies); 544 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-9 (1972)
(toothpastes and dentifrices); 527 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-20
(1972) (air conditioners and electric shavers); 517 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. A-1 (1971) (automobiles). The substantiation requirements are not
applied to random claims; and the FTC cannot, of course, evaluate all claims
made for all products. Rather, a preliminary determination is necessarily made
by the FTC staff as to which questionable representations reach the widest
audience.
91. The new requirement not only was expected to assist consumers in making
a rational choice among competing claims, but also was intended to increase
competition by allowing small competitors to report and thus deflate the unsub-
stantiated claims of large advertisers. "Mhe companies making superior products
[would] thus be able to get their messages across." Summary of Remarks by Robert
Pitofsky, Director of Bureau of Competition, 517 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. A-1 (1971).
92. 5 TRADE REG. REP. T 50,135, at 55,220 (1972) (FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection Report on the advertising substantiation program to aid in the debate
on the proposed Truth-in-Advertising Bill, S. 1461, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972));
FTC Resolution, reprinted in 517 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. D-1 (1971)
(requiring submission of special reports relating to advertising claims).
93. Address by FTC Chairman Kirkpatrick Before the Consumer Federation
of America, reprinted in 548 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-26 (1972).
94. Id.
95. Statements by Robert Pitofsky, reprinted in 592 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. A-12 (1972). See also Pitofsky Interview AA-2.
96. FTC Staff Report, reprinted in part in 574 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. R P. A-14 (1972). In December, 1972, the Institute for Public Interest
Representation at the Georgetown Law Center released an exhaustive study of the
substantiating evidence for the claims made by television set manufacturers.
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substantiation reports for almost a year, with the foreseeable result
that no one would bother to check substantiation data for an old
advertising campaign. 97  But the advertisers need not have resorted
to such obfuscatory techniques because few people even read the
reports. 8
Rather than abolish the advertising substantiation plan, the
FTC has expanded it. 9 Furthermore, by utilizing the information
submitted to build its cases, the Commission's recently-issued rea-
sonable basis complaints against automobile00 and air conditioner
Thirty-two of the fifty-nine target claims selected by the FTC were found not to
have been adequately substantiated; fourteen of the remaining claims involved
standard features available on all models. Apparently only four claimi were
passable. Institute for Public Interest Representation Report, reprinted in part in
591 BNA ANTUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-10 (1972). For an excellent example
of how a competitor can utilize these studies to educate the consumer and to
deter future reasonable basis violations, see NEWswEEg, Feb. 12, 1973, at 41,
where an advertisement, based on the Institute's study, is entitled "SONY. NO
BALONEY." Earlier Sony color television advertisements were among the four
substantiated claims that "contained reliable information about unique features
which the consumer could use in the choice of a television." Id.
97. See 593 BNA ANTTusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-1 (reluctance to pub-
licize trade secrets was ostensibly the cause of delay).
98. 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,135, at 55,220 (1972) (Bureau of Consumer
Protection Report on the advertising substantiation program to aid in the debate
of the proposed Truth-in-Advertising Bill, S. 1461, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972)).
In addition to this lack of interest, or possibly because of it, in the program's first
year no one outside the FTC was able to call attention to gaps in any substantiation
report that were not previously found by the FTC staff. However, public interest
groups, academicians, and several journalists had "expressed interest." 5 TRADE
REo. REP. 50,135, at 55,220 (1972). If at least this level of interest can be
maintained, the program may have some positive impact. See note 96 supra.
99. The FTC recently decided to conduct a supermarket survey of retail food
prices, in order to encourage truthful advertising claims and to aid the grocery
shopper in making rational product choices. This "informational" program will
examine chain-store pricing of 50 to 100 selected common items within specified
metropolitan areas. 596 BNA ANTrmusT & TRADe REG. REP. A-1 (1973).
Although the FTC intends to continue the program, the Commission has
moved it into a "second generation" to deal with some of these problems. The
demands by the FTC will emphasize major selling themes instead of particular
advertising claims and will also require a summary of the documentation in "plain
language" in order to encourage consumers to examine the material. News Con-
ference Held by Robert Pitofsky, Director of FTC Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, reprinted in part in 593 BNA ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-1 (1972).
Pending an assessment of this revitalized program, the FTC will continue to oppose
the Truth-in-Advertising Bill, S. 1461, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), which would
substitute the requirement that advertisers provide individual consumers with sub-
stantiation at the cost of duplication and mailing. Id.
100. The complaints against General Motors for its claims that "Vega is the
best handling passenger car ever built in the United States" and "the chassis of
the Buick Opel never needs lubrication" alleged only that the advertiser lacked a
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manufacturers"' have gone beyond the purposes of the plan as orig-
inally outlined.1 2
prior reasonable basis for the claim. General Motors Corp., 3 TRADE REo. REP.
1 20,183, at 22,163 (FTC Dec. 11, 1972).
101. The FTC has lodged complaints against advertising Fedders air condi-
tioners' unique reserve cooling power; Rheem air conditioners' quietest, most effi-
cient system, "revolutionary" in its continual refreshing of inside air; and
Whirlpool air conditioners' substantially greater initial cooling capacity. In addi-
tion to the reasonable basis charge, these complaints alleged that the representations
were false, misleading, and deceptive. Fedders Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 20,120,
at 22,102 (FTC Oct. 12, 1972).
102. Applying sanctions, with the possibility of criminal penalties, on the basis
of the submitted information, raises an interesting fifth amendment question. Al-
though the FTC has all but ignored its power to seek criminal penalties, NADER
REPoRT 64, 194, there are criminal provisions in many of the statutes entrusted to
FTC enforcement. Sections 12 and 14 of the FTCA contain the provisions most
important for advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 54(a) (1970).
Although a "required records" exception to the self-incrimination clause has
long been recognized in order to effectuate administrative regulations, the Supreme
Court has placed limitations on the exception. An administrative information
requirement must be "essentially regulatory" to avoid constitutional review.
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1962). Whereas statutes directed at the
general public, Galven v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 866-69, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642,
652-53, 452 P.2d 930, 940-41 (1969) (gun registration ordinance), or at a group
"numbering in the millions," California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (hit-
and-rn statute), have met the "essentially regulatory" test, statutes directed at
"highly selective group[s] inherently suspect of criminal activities" have not.
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (federal gun registration statute); cf.
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 469 (dissenting opinion). The advertisement
substantiation requirement, clearly aimed at a select group, falls somewhere in
between. Should the information program not be "essentially regulatory," adver-
tisers might argue that there existed a substantial hazard of self-incrimination
which outweighed any genuine need for the data. Unless the FTC could grant
formal immunity from prosecution in exchange for compliance, see Organized
Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1970), or unless the Supreme Court even-
tually imposed a use restriction, see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 442-58
(concurring opinion), the substantial hazard of possible criminal penalties might
be enough to extend fifth amendment protection to advertisers and permit them
to withhold advertising substantiation data.
This would in effect create two separate regulatory schemes-one for indi-
viduals and partnerships and one for corporations-since there is no corporate
fifth amendment privilege to protect corporate records. E.g., George Campbell
Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968); Hyster Co. v. United States, 338
F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964)
(even where the sole shareholder was attempting to prevent the introduction of
documents, the privilege was not applicable). However, the fifth amendment can
have little practical effect on the FTC, unless the individual officers are subject
to liability. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957); Smith,
The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FORTUNE, April, 1961, at 132-37, May, 1961,
at 161-64 (where top corporation executives were forced to serve short prison
terms for price-fixing activities on behalf of the corporation). Because large cor-
porations are responsible for most nationally regulated advertising, the fifth amend-
ment has as yet posed no serious barrier to FTC substantiation demands.
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Problems of Enforcing the Standard: The Need for a Suitable Rem-
edy
Assuming the FTC can satisfy the burden of showing that a
particular claim was made without a reasonable basis,1"' effective
remedies must be devised before the new doctrine can have serious
impact on advertisers. 10 The unfairness that must be remedied in
these cases is not the deception of or direct injury to consumers, but
rather the imposition on consumers of the economic risk that the
product might not perform as advertised. 0 5 The injury occurs at
the time of sale; the remedy, therefore, must focus on the method
of marketing and not on the future performance of the product.
Cease-and-desist orders. The cease-and-desist order seems in-
appropriate to remedy a reasonable basis violation. If the order
prohibits a claim only until the advertiser can produce substantia-
tion under the reasonable basis test, the violator can still delay his
substantiation tests until after the claim is challenged-thus defeat-
ing the purpose of a prior reasonable basis requirement. Further-
more, the cease-and-desist order, as a remedy in the nature of an
injunction, provides no real sanction for the first offense.'0 6 How-
ever, an advertiser who ignored a final order conceivably would be
subject in the future to civil or even criminal penalties.10 7
On the other hand, if the order is framed to prohibit the rep-
resentation altogether, the refusal to consider post-advertisement sub-
stantiation becomes more significant.'1 8  If the belated documenta-
tion substantiating the claim is held to be irrelevant, the cease-and-
103. Under the reasonable basis test, as under the test for deception, "sub-
stantial evidence" is required to insulate the Commission's fact-finding from ju-
dicial review. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion . . . . It excludes vague, uncertain, or irrelevant matter." Carlay Co.
v. FTC, 153 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1946) (reversing FTC ruling that "Ayds"
candy did not lead to "easy" weight reduction without a starvation diet). It is
clear, however, that what is "uncertain" matter in *a deception or falsity case
would not necessarily be excludable in a reasonable basis case.
104. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
105. Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,056, at 22,029 (FTC July 11, 1972); see
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 388 (1965).
106. All the general criticisms of the cease-and-desist order are equally applica-
ble here. See note 13 supra.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1970) (civil sanction of up to $5000 per day per vio-
lation). See note 13 supra. In the area of food, drugs, and cosmetics, criminal
penalties can theoretically be sought against the violator. 15 U.S.C. § 54(a)
(1970).
108. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,056, at 22,031 (FTC July 11,
1972); H.W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1295 (1963).
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desist order not only fails to remedy the initial wrong, but may also
extend beyond the FTC's negative function of preventing falsity and
fraud; 10 9 for the claim, even though it shifts economic risks to the
consumer, may still be true. Once the claim is proved true, so that
in fact no injury to the consumer has resulted and the economic risk
has been dissipated, a permanent cease-and-desist order does not
protect the consumer except for its deterrent effect on future unsub-
stantiated claims. Whether that possible effect by itself will justify
a harsh permanent cease-and-desist order is questionable.
Corrective advertising. Many of the shortcomings of the
cease-and-desist order procedure have been alleviated by the Com-
mission's increasing reliance on corrective advertising."10 Despite
initial setbacks in its corrective advertising efforts,"' the FTC con-
tinues to draft proposed corrective advertising orders. The typical
order requires twenty-five percent of the product's advertising over
109. See Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950); FTC v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), afI'd, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.
1963). In ruling on the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction of certain
analgesic advertisements, the district court in Sterling Drug held that "[i]f the
advertisement is not false, defendants have a constitutional right to utilize it even
though its content and blatancy may annoy both the Commission and the general
public." 215 F. Supp. at 332.
Even when the representation has been held to be false, the courts have not
granted the FTC the power to prohibit the claim altogether if it might at some
future time be truthful. Cotherman v. FTC, 417 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1969) (order
prohibiting the advertising of loan terms which were in fact not offered was modi-
fied because the terms might be offered in the future); FTC v. Civil Serv. Training
Bureau, 79 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1935) (FTC order prohibiting a correspondence
school from representing there were government jobs available for its graduates
was modified because there might be such jobs in the future). Contra, Century
Metalcraft Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1940).
110. See Pitofsky Interview AA.-3 (characterization of corrective advertising as
the "only really effective remedy for advertising excesses").
For cases where the FTC has proposed corrective advertising, see Sanford
Levinson, 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 20,080, at 22,050 (FTC Aug. 16, 1972); Sugar
Ass'n, 3 TRADE REQ. REP. 1 19,857, at 21,872 (FTC 1971); Warner-Lambert
Pharm. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,838, at 21,859 (FTC 1971); Amstar Corp.,
3 TADE REG. REP. f 19,696, at 21,742 (FTC 1971); ITT Continental Baking Co.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. V 19,681, at 21,727 (FTC 1971). See also Note, supra note 13.
111. See ITT Continental Baking Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,182, at 22,162
(FTC 1972). In ITT Continental, the hearing examiner rejected the staff's first
contested proposed order requiring corrective advertising, although the examiner
dismissed on the ground that the staff had not proven falsity or deception by show-
ing sufficient potential impact on consumers. The FTC had regarded this litiga-
tion against the makers of "Wonderbread" as a test case for corrective advertising.
Pitofsky Interview AA-3. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 TRADE REG.
REP. 20,112, at 22,077 (FTC Sept. 22, 1972) (opinion modified Feb. 16, 1973),
where the FTC rejected the corrective advertising order sought by a student
consumer interest group.
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a stated period (usually one or two years) to carry an FTC-approved
retraction designed to dispel the continuing residual effects of the
unfair claim. 112  Recently the Commission obtained its first signed
consent order'13 requiring a seller of swimming pools to devote
twenty-five percent of his advertisements for one year to informing
the public that the FTC had questioned his practices.11 4  The Com-
mission has also held that it could compel a violator to buy correc-
tive advertising, whereas previously the advertiser had the theoretical
option of not advertising at all for that year.115 Should the FTC
compel advertisers to purchase space or time devoted to warning
the public that they were being treated as guinea pigs for untested
products, corrective advertising would become a powerful weapon
against reasonable basis violations.
Counteradvertising. Another innovative remedy considered by
the FTC is counteradvertising-short free advertisements sponsored
by competitors or special interest groups. Counteradvertisements
respond to commercials raising controversial issues of public impor-
tance, rebut advertising claims raising controversial scientific conclu-
sions, and inform consumers of important negative ramifications
which the challenged advertisement ignored.116 Counteradvertising
has yet to be tested in the courts; it has been heavily criticized both
by the White House 1 7 and by the Federal Communications Commis-
112. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,925, at 21,937
(FTC 1972) (requiring "Lysol" manufacturers to include statements that "Lysol" will
not reduce colds or flu, after Sterling had made the impliedly deceptive claim that
"Lysol" disinfectant "kills germs on environmental surfaces," with the knowledge
that such surface germs did not cause either flu or colds); American Home Prods.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,962, at 21,984 (FTC 1972) (proposed corrective order
for a reasonable basis violation-aspirin manufacturers claiming their products
would relieve nervous tension and the stresses of everyday life).
113. Proposed complaints notify the respondent not only of the charges against
him but of the form the proposed order would take. 16 C.F.R. § 2.31 (1972).
Within ten days after the service of the complaint, respondent has the option of
disposing of the proceeding by a consent order, id. § 2.32, which in effect means
the respondent will agree to comply with the FTC's proposed order without fur-
ther adjudication on the merits. If the respondent refuses to accept a consent
order, a formal complaint usually follows. Id. §§ 2.21-.35.
114. Sanford Levinson, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,080, at 22,050 (FTC 1972).
115. Sugar Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,857, at 21,872 (FTC 1971) (a
trade association, with no commercial necessity to advertise during the time the
corrective order would be in effect, was compelled to advertise to dispel the de-
ception of past advertisements).
116. Address by FTC Chairman Kirkpatrick, supra note 93, at A-27. But see Al-
berty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (if a controversy exists over the
worth of a product, a positive advertising claim need not mention the equally
credible opposite conclusion).
117. Clay Whitehead, Director of the White House Office of Telecommunica-
tions Policy, responded to then FTC Chairman Kirkpatrick's counteradvertising
Vol. 1973:563]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
sion, which would presumably carry the responsibility of adminis-
tering any counteradvertising program."'8 Nevertheless, under the
new FTC scheme of regulation, counteradvertising would often be
appropriate, particularly in situations similar to the headache reme-
dies cases where claims are based on unproven scientific premises."1 0
If such a program were workable, the Commission could allow the
tested but unproven statement to be communicated through adver-
tisements while giving the consumer access to "contrary ideas. '120
The combination of an advertisement and a counteradvertisement
would permit consumers to make their own choice and might facili-
tate product comparisons. Moreover, the threat of counteradvertis-
ing could deter an advertiser from making unsubstantiated, unquali-
fied claims.
The FTC has already negotiated with the National Broadcast-
ing Company for free counteradvertising time for a farm lobby's re-
buttal to a railroad association's paid endorsement of the Surface
Transportation Act.121  However, commercial advertising of con-
sumer goods was not involved in this negotiation. The economics
and mechanics of any program encompassing product counterad-
vertisements might be so complex as to be unmanageable and coun-
terproductive. Determining from among many competitors and con-
sumer groups who may rebut and deciding what controversial ma-
terial requires refutation may be insurmountable problems.
proposal with a scathing indictment of what Whitehead termed the FTC's attempt
to kill the "goose [that is, advertising] that lays the golden egg." Address by
Mr. Whitehead, reprinted in 551 BNA ANTrrrtST & TRADE REG. REP. A-19,
A-20 (1972).
118. The FCC's duties would stem from its role in enforcing the fairness doc-
trine, upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which
imposes an affirmative obligation on broadcasters to provide reasonable amounts
of time for the consideration of conflicting views on "public issues." Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949). In Banzhaf
v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court upheld an FCC determination
that commercial cigarette advertising, despite its nonrational format, was con-
troversial speech on a "public issue;" hence broadcasters were required to present a
reasonable number of antismoking messages in order to satisfy the pressing public
need for "an abundant and ready supply of relevant information." Id. at 1089.
119. See Address by Robert Pitofsky, reprinted in part in 558 BNA ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. A-23 (1972).
120. Id.
121. The American Association of Railroads, in what the farmers termed a
"highly propagandistic" presentation, urged viewers to support the proposed Sur-
face Transportation Act, H.R. 12,209, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The farm
coalition argued that passage would permit the railroads more easily to abandon
track in rural areas and that tax increases, service reductions, and "outrageous
government handouts" would inevitably result. See 560 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. A-28 (1972).
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At the present time, the FTC has received little cooperation in
expanding this program beyond the voluntary network negotia-
tions; and some advertisers have threatened to cease advertising on
network television rather than submit to counteradvertisements.'2 2
Nevertheless, in combination with a prohibition against nonrational
entertainment advertisements,123 counteradvertising would seem to
be an effective means of upgrading informational advertising.124
Strict enforcement of the prior reasonable basis doctrine may
not be justified. 12 5  If the truth of a claim is "discovered," whether
by subsequent testing or sustained consumer use, or if the claim has
a reasonable basis at the time of the order, there are no lingering effects
of the violation that require corrective advertising or any other
remedy. 126  Any sanction then imposed would be punitive, contrary
122. 558 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-23, -24 (1972) (statements
by broadcasting company and advertising agency executives).
123. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
124. The FTC has also experimented with requiring refunds to unsatisfied cus-
tomers. See note 16 supra. In cases where a reasonable basis has not been es-
tablished prior to the framing of the order, the FTC could justify this remedy as
the most effective means of removing the economic risk.
Injunctions might also be useful. Although the FTC's injunction-seeking
powers, 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970), are specifically limited to preventing the false
advertising of "food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics," 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), the
FTC has not interpreted this limitation strictly. Thus, the FTC sought to enjoin
the dissemination through the mail of free sample razor blades; the temporary in-
junction was thought to be necessary in order to prevent consumer injuries from
an impending second mailing. The FTC's theory looked behind the words of the
act to interpret the provision's purpose as the protection of consumers from immi-
nent, irreparable harm. However, the Commission obviated the need for the courts
to pass on the injunction request by simultaneously arousing enough public opinion
to convince Philip Morris to delay voluntarily the second mailing. Philip Morris,
Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,153, at 22,141 (FTC Dec. 1, 1972).
The temporary injunction would seem to have little chance of acceptance
where only the possibility of economic risk was at issue. See FTC v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
125. The advertising substantiation program, as well as Pfizer, was fashioned to
enable consumers to distinguish between the seller who is advertising truthfully
and one who is unfairly representing that he has proof when in fact the proof is
inadequate. FTC's Resolution Requiring Submission of Special Reports Relating
to Advertising Claims, reprinted in 517 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. D-1
(1971). But this distinction may be impossible, because true claims can often be
made with inadequate substantiation.
126. However, the Commission may avoid admitting such a result by dismissing
the accompanying false advertising charge with the statement that the FTC merely
failed to discharge its burden of proof. See Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE RaG. REP.
20,056, at 22,039 (FTC July 11, 1972).
In an interesting case decided in 1961, advertising claims for a coupling pipe
which would "condition" and remove harmful elements from water could not have
had a prior reasonable basis under any standard. Nineteen experts testified for
the FTC that, by nearly unanimous scientific opinion, a coupling pipe could not
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to the overall truth-seeking function of the FTC, and thus beyond the
FTC's power.1"7 Perhaps such punitive attacks are an inevitable con-
sequence of shifting from an objective true-false determination to an
examination of the advertiser's decision-making process. However,
prior substantiation should not be an end in itself but only a tech-
nique to aid the information and truth-seeking functions of the
FTC, which in turn enable consumers to make rational product
choices. Furthermore, there is the pressing danger that coerced
substantiation, in its attempt to raise the overall level of truthful-
ness, may be evaded by a reduction in the informational content of
advertisements, 128 a strategy which would actually undermine the
ultimate goal of rational product choices.
First Amendment Conflict
The seeming incongruity of prohibiting true statements sug-
gests an examination of the scope of first amendment protection.
Although "free speech" protection has not yet been extended to
commercial advertising,129 certain paid advertisements-especially
truthful product comparisons-arguably merit this protection. 30
The FTC's proposal to apply the fairness doctrine to commercial
representations' indicates that the Commission has accepted the
underlying premise of this argument-namely that informative ad-
vertisements discussing the relative quality of consumer goods raise
controversial issues of public importance. 3 2  In New York Times v.
affect water in the manner alleged. Nevertheless the respondent paraded ninety-
one satisfied users of the water conditioner, "guinea pigs" who had assumed the
economic risk; and the court reversed the FTC. Evis Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 287 F.2d
831, 847 (9th Cir. 1961).
127. See Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 23 (5th
Cir. 1960); Menzies v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957
(1957); Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Hearings on S.
3744, supra note 20, at 5 (statement of Commissioner Davis), reprinted in Dunn,
supra note 20, at 366; Note, supra note 13, at 491; cf. Thain, supra note 9, at
625-26 (the author sees the remedies not as punitive but as a part of an educa-
tional process whereby businessmen will learn to maximize profits and public
benefits).
128. See notes 83-88 supra and accompanying text.
129. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942); Redish, supra note 8, at 450-57.
130. Redish, supra note 8, at 443-48; Comment, Psychological Advertising,
supra note 79, at 1121; Comment, supra note 80, at 187. See generally Meikle-
john, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245.
131. See notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
132. Compare Counteradvertising Proposal by FTC Chairman Kirkpatrick, re-
printed in 548 BNA ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-27 (1972) with Redish,
supra note 8, at 434-48. See also Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197, 198 (1946),
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Sullivan,'3 the Supreme Court stated that the "debate on [such]
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Al-
though Times was a private libel action, the first amendment has
since been extended to protect not only all "newsworthy" com-
ment,134 but also all matters in which the public has a legitimate in-
terest.135  Furthermore, the limits of this expanding protection are
not yet in sight.' 36 Thus, respondents who obtain substantiation after
their advertising claim may have a legitimate first amendment de-
fense to the reasonable basis complaint.'" 7
THE NEED FOR A REASONABLE BASIS REQUIREMENT
Overlap with Existing Programs
Aside from the sizable enforcement problems, it is unclear as
a matter of policy whether the benefits of the Pfizer reasonable basis
doctrine are worth the costs. Arguably, the reasonable basis doc-
trine is unnecessary since there is a considerable overlap with the
traditional deception charge. If it is assumed that the FTC cannot
prove the advertising claim lacked prior substantiation, the claim
may still be false and misleading and, therefore, unfair by conven-
tional standards. Although the standard propounded by the aspirin
cases in effect would decide the true-false question, 8" proving a
claim false and misleading in some instances may be easier than
showing that no reasonable basis for the claim existed.' 39
where the FCC argued that the fairness doctrine extended to commercial repre-
sentations that raise "basic and important social, economic, or political issues."
133. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
134. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
135. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
136. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968).
137. One court has already stated that "[i]f the advertisement is not false,
defendants have a constitutional right to utilize it .. .:' FTC v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963),
discussed in note 109 supra.
138. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
139. Tests by both the manufacturer and the FTC conducted any time are rele-
vant to the false and misleading question. Against allegations of falsity, the ad-
vertiser is not restricted to information that he actually used in. his marketing
decision, but may introduce information that he might have used. In lieu of evalu-
ating the thought processes of the marketing decision-maker, the charge of decep-
tion or falsity focuses on the mind of the consumer: a claim is deceptive if, with
respect to the intended audience, it has the "capacity" to mislead. E.g., Gelb v.
FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944), where an advertisement for "permanent" hair
coloring was held deceptive, even though the prosecution's witness had not herself
been deceived; Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,056, at 22,031 (FTC July 11,
1972); Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 562. In testing the impact of a statement on
consumers, the deduction a "reasonable man" would make is not conclusive.
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On the other hand, recent developments have reduced the over-
lap between reasonable basis complaints and deception charges.140
Formerly, when purchasers believed that manufacturers substanti-
ated their claims,1 41 the deception charge might have covered rea-
sonable basis cases. But deception complaints are becoming very
difficult to prove since the typical consumer and even susceptible
groups such as children no longer expect absolute truth in adver-
tising. 142 However, to permit advertisers to defend false claims on
the ground that no one believes them would seriously erode the con-
sumer protection role of the FTC. Hence the new reasonable basis
standard may have been adopted in part to encourage consumer
awareness and to enable the FTC at the same time to maintain a
strong regulatory scheme.
Practical Advantages
Although most complaints issued against advertisers for claims
having no reasonable basis are likely to be joined with charges of
deception or falsity,14 3 the Pfizer standard is advantageous to the
The IFTC has the responsibility for protecting not only the gullible and
foolish. E.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.
1944); see Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 562; cf. H.W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282,
1290 (1963). It must also protect especially susceptible audiences, such as children,
the elderly, and the economically unsophisticated. See generally D. CAPLOViTZ, THE
POOR PAY MORE (1963). Since the inquiry is focused on the group to whom the
claim is directed, a demonstration that a susceptible group was the target of the
advertisement would increase the chances of finding deception. See Thain, supra
note 79, at 493-95.
Although one of the reasonable basis factors, the likely degree of consumer re-
liance, appears to take individual disabilities into account, the FTC has not as yet
used this criterion to require a higher degree of prior substantiation. See Pfizer,
Inc., 3 TRmDE REa. REP. 1 20,056, at 22,030 (FTC July 11, 1972).
140. Nevertheless, in many cases the FTC will find it easier to prove no reason-
able basis for the claim than to prove an advertisement false or deceptive.
Because the burden of coming forward with evidence has been shifted, the FTC
need only consider the information actually utilized by the advertiser at the time of
the claim, thus limiting a full-scale battle of the experts. If the analgesics com-
plaints are upheld, the contradictory testimony of one or two credible experts
might even be enough to support a section 5 violation.
141. See H.W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1295 (1963); Travers 554. As late
as the mid-1960's, most consumers utilized advertising as the major source of
product information, since the individual seemingly did not incur any marginal
increased cost by doing so. Advertising was generally believed to be accurate.
R. BAUER & S. GREYSER, ADvERTISING IN AMERICA: THE CONSUMER VIEw 330-33
(1968) (consumer poll).
142. In dismissing the FTC staff complaint in ITT Continental Baking Co.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,182, at 22,162 (FTC Dec. 27, 1972), the hearing examiner
found that even five-year-olds did not believe that the essential nutrients in
"Wonderbread" accelerated growth.
143. See Fedders Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 20,120, at 22,102 (FrC Oct. 12,
1972); note 101 supra.
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prosecution for several reasons. While the reasonable basis charge
itself does not shift the Commission's burden of proving a section 5
violation, 14 4 it does shift the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence. Where previously the FTC carried the burden of investigating
and proving truth, falsity, or deception, the respondent is now required
to introduce his prior substantiation; and the FTC's burden is re-
duced to showing that such evidence is insufficient. 145  Consider-
able investigative costs formerly incurred by the FTC are thus shifted
to the advertiser where, under the Commission's theory, such costs
belonged in the first place. Since investigations usually take up to
two years before the issuance of a complaint,14 the transfer of this
investigative burden could lead to quicker challenges. The delay
between an unfair advertising claim and the FTC's final order would
be shortened. Not only would this free the Commission's resources
for other regulatory programs, but also the consumer would receive
expedited protection from unsubstantiated, potentially false and mis-
leading advertising claims.
Even though the cost of prior substantiation must eventually be
passed on to consumers, the manufacturer, necessarily having ac-
cumulated some substantiating data in the production process, is in
the best position to perform the investigating function at the least
cost to society. 47  A purchaser can seldom initiate investigations on
his own because the costs of an individual inquiry are greater than
any possible increased satisfaction he might derive from making the
"right' product choice. Aside from automobiles, few consumer pur-
chases are large enough for an effective study by each buyer.148
It is arguable that consumers would rather make an occasional
"wrong" product choice than pay the added cost of prior substan-
tiation for advertisements. Since the credibility of advertisers is so
144. See Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,056, at 22,039 (FTC July 11,
1972); cf. Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707, 715-16 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (opinion dis-
senting in part). On the other hand, the shifting of the entire burden of proof
has been recommended, despite the constitutional implications of imposing a
presumption of guilt. NADER REPORT 165.
145. 585 BNA ANTrRtUsT & TRADE REG. REP. B-4 (1972) (analysis of Pfizer).
146. See ABA REPORT 30-32.
147. E.g., Pfizer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,056, at 22,033 (FTC July 11,
1972); BISHOP 183-87. But cf. ABA REPORT 106 (separate statement of Richard
Posner):
Just as the cheapest way to reduce the incidence of certain crimes, such
as car theft, is by inducing potential victims to take simple precautions
(locking car doors), so possibly the incidence of certain frauds could be
reduced at least cost to society by insisting that consumers exercise a
modicum of care in purchasing, rather than placing restrictions on sellers'
marketing methods.
148. See Travers 552.
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low, it would not be surprising if many consumers saw Pfizer solely
in terms of an across-the-board price rise. On the other hand, con-
sumers arguably have always been paying the equivalent of this in-
cremental cost; all too often the economic risk that a product would
not perform as advertised may have become actual economic injury.
Thus the requirement of prior substantiation for advertising claims
might merely be an attractive technique for spreading the risk among
all consumers. Even in the unlikely event that the added cost of prior
substantiation approaches the amount of economic loss due to
"wrong" product choices,149 forced substantiation will at least shift
this cost to the relatively rich; this is because the economically dis-
advantaged are most susceptible to advertising deception and bear a
disproportionate share of the present loss,""° whereas any price rise
would be absorbed by all consumers. Furthermore, since the im-
portance of advertising and consumer reliance thereon has been
-generally recognized, a reasonable basis standard that raised the
overall level of truthfulness at little or no cost to society might partially
justify present mind-boggling advertising budgets.
CONCLUSION
The reasonable basis doctrine expands the FTC role far be-
yond the negative function of preventing falsity and fraud. 51' To
fortify the consumer's "right to be informed,"'15 2 the FTC's new posi-
tive approach aims at increasing the consumer's ability to make ra-
tional product choices. Consumers need no longer rely on the ad-
vertiser's "social consciousness"' 53 for the proper testing of products.
Although the FTC has not yet forced advertisements to become
"fountain[s] of relevant information,"'" 4 the revitalized unfairness
standard attempts to ensure that the offered information will be
accurate. In Pfizer, the FTC focused on marketing methods and
the imposition of economic risk rather than on product performance
and subsequent economic loss, with the expectation that prior sub-
stantiation would raise the general level of advertising truthfulness.
Although the FTC has expanded its advertising policing tech-
niques, a thorough investigation in some cases would reveal that
claims made without a reasonable basis would also be deceptive
149. See Pitofsky Interview AA-2.
150. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 139.
151. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
152. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMERS' PROTECTION AND INTEREST
PROGRAM, H.R. Doc. No. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
153. BisHop 140.
154. Id. at 114.
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or false and misleading. The Commission should still apply tradi-
tional standards in those blatant cases where falsity is easy to prove
by simply concentrating on the injury to various consumers. Un-
fortunately, few cases seem to turn on such black and white true-
false distinctions. The reasonable basis test attacks the large gray
area where advertising claims are difficult to prove false. By de-
claring unfair and unlawful all advertising representations made with-
out a prior reasonable basis and by forcing a shift in the burden of
bringing forth evidence, the Commission has made section 5 an
easier and less expensive law to administer. If the difficulties in
applying the test can be overcome, the Commission may finally
emerge as an effective regulator of commercial advertising.

